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Abstract
Complex social behaviour of primates has usually been attributed to the operation of complex cognition. Recently, models
have shown that constraints imposed by the socio-spatial structuring of individuals in a group may result in an
unexpectedly high number of patterns of complex social behaviour, resembling the dominance styles of egalitarian and
despotic species of macaques and the differences between them. This includes affiliative patterns, such as reciprocation of
grooming, grooming up the hierarchy, and reconciliation. In the present study, we show that the distribution of support in
fights, which is the social behaviour that is potentially most sophisticated in terms of cognitive processes, may emerge in
the same way. The model represents the spatial grouping of individuals and their social behaviour, such as their avoidance
of risks during attacks, the self-reinforcing effects of winning and losing their fights, their tendency to join in fights of others
that are close by (social facilitation), their tendency to groom when they are anxious, the reduction of their anxiety by
grooming, and the increase of anxiety when involved in aggression. Further, we represent the difference in intensity of
aggression apparent in egalitarian and despotic macaques. The model reproduces many aspects of support in fights, such
as its different types, namely, conservative, bridging and revolutionary, patterns of choice of coalition partners attributed to
triadic awareness, those of reciprocation of support and ‘spiteful acts’ and of exchange between support and grooming.
This work is important because it suggests that behaviour that seems to result from sophisticated cognition may be a side-
effect of spatial structure and dominance interactions and it shows that partial correlations fail to completely omit these
effects of spatial structure. Further, the model is falsifiable, since it results in many patterns that can easily be tested in real
primates by means of existing data.
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Introduction
When observing complex behaviour of animals, we automat-
ically attribute it to sophisticated cognitive mechanisms. This is
usually accepted when observing intelligent animals, such as
primates and humans [1], but not in the case of social insects,
when we study, for instance, the complex organization of their
large colonies [2] or the highly sophisticated architecture of their
nests, such as termite hills [3]. The cognitive complexity of insects
is known to be limited and, therefore, complexity of traits is
thought to arise by self-organization [4,5]. However, more
recently, complex traits in taxa with great cognitive sophistication
have also increasingly been considered to be due to self-
organization based on cognitively simple behavioural rules [6–
8]. This even includes patterns of behaviour in humans, such as
the segregation of races [9] and the complexity of financial
markets [10]. This means that it is difficult to tell what part of the
complex spontaneous behaviour of highly intelligent animals, such
as primates, is due to cognitive sophistication and what part is due
self-organization [11].
In the present paper, we demonstrate in a computer model that
among agents with minimal cognition, patterns of coalitions
emerge from grouping, dominance interactions, and grooming
through self-organization. These cognitively simple agents appear
to form coalitions, show patterns usually thought to indicate triadic
awareness in the choice of coalition partners, and reciprocate
support in fights and exchange it for grooming.
More than any other behaviour, coalition formation has been
thought to reflect the cognitive sophistication of primates [12].
Recruitment of support is believed to involve awareness of the
social relationships between other individuals in connection with
the relations between the individual itself and these other
individuals, so-called ‘triadic awareness’ [12–18]. Support in fights
and grooming have been regarded as altruistic and according to
the framework of reciprocal altruism, their receipt should be
repaid in return [19] by cognitively keeping track of the number of
acts given to, and received from each partner, so-called calculated
reciprocity [20–22]. Calculated reciprocity was suggested to be
most complicated in cases where individuals reciprocated not only
their support but also their opposition towards others (called
contra-support), showing so-called spiteful behaviour [20].
The necessary involvement of sophisticated cognitive abilities in
reciprocation is a point of view that is not adhered to by all
scientists. For example, Range and Noe ¨ [23] argue that in
recruiting support, individuals may simply recruit others of higher
rank than themselves and no triadic awareness is needed. Stevens
and colleagues [24–26] contend that food sharing reflects tolerated
theft [27] and that calculated reciprocity has so far not been shown
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e37271[28]. Others suggest that coalition behaviour may involve simple
rules of thumb [29], that its reciprocation and exchange may
emerge as a side-effect from opportunistic attacks [30–32] or
involve a kind of emotional book-keeping [33] and that
chimpanzees are not able to show spiteful behaviour, but that
they merely retaliate [34]. In agreement with this, animal taxa
with supposedly lower cognitive abilities, such as hyenas, appear to
show patterns of coalition behaviour and reciprocation similar to
primates [35].
In our study, we avoid this debate on what intelligence underlies
complex social behaviour in primates. Instead, our study is part of
a broader research program, in studies of humans and animals,
also called the ‘low-intelligence approach’ [10] or that of ‘minimal
cognition’ [7], in which ‘null-models’ are developed for complex
patterns of behaviour. We use an earlier computer model [36] to
investigate whether patterns of coalition, such as reciprocation of
support and the exchange between support and grooming, may
result through self-organization due to aversion of risks of attack,
anxiety-reducing effects of grooming and socio-spatial structuring.
We give individual agents ‘minimal cognition’: individuals
aggregate and when they are too close to others, they are more
likely to attack them if they are under the impression that they will
win [37,38]. Winning and losing has self-reinforcing effects [39–
42]. However, when individuals fear defeat, they will tend to
groom the other individual, particularly when they are anxious
[36]. Coalitions may emerge in the model as a consequence of
‘social facilitation’, i.e., an individual C close to a fight is activated
sooner than another individual that is further away. Such spatial
proximity (e.g., C being close to the two combatants, A and B,
Figure 1) may incidentally result in support in the fight when an
individual (C) attacks one of two combatants (e.g., B), because this
is counted as an act of support (for A) and opposition (to B)(also
called contra-support), as is done when recording behaviour of real
primates [20,30,31,43–50]. In the present paper, we will refer to
contra-support by the word ‘opposition’.
In our present study, we first derive predictions for our model by
means of a survey of empirical patterns of coalition (Table 1).
Primate species have been shown to differ in dominance style or
type of society, often classified as egalitarian and despotic, with
different gradations [51,52]. Since dominance style has been
shown to influence patterns of both aggression and grooming
[51,53,54], we also study the relationship between dominance style
and coalitions in the model. In primates, the most detailed
comparison between despotic and egalitarian species has been
made in the genus of macaques. Here, despotic species differ from
egalitarian ones in several traits: they have a steeper hierarchy,
lower frequency of aggression, more asymmetrical aggression,
greater dominance of females over males [42], a lower conciliatory
tendency [51,53], and more grooming up the hierarchy and of
others of similar rank [36].
We have shown in earlier studies that this modelling approach
produces both the patterns of aggression, grooming and conciliatory
behaviour exhibited by many primate species and the differences
between egalitarian and despotic species of macaques [7,36,38,42],
while in our present study, we demonstrate that these findings still hold
for a larger group size (of 30 instead of 12 individuals) [36].
Furthermore, we show that such an approach also leads to surprisingly
good predictions regarding new patterns: different types of coalitions,
i.e., conservative, bridging or revolutionary coalitions [55], indications
of triadicawareness in the choice ofcoalition partners, reciprocation of
support and opposition and exchange between support and grooming.
We deliver predictions to verify our findings.
Methods
Survey of empirical data
To compare the results of the model to empirical data, we
surveyed the literature on coalitions in primates (Table 1). We
confine ourselves to adults and to Old World primates, because
New World primates differ in their patterns of social interactions,
e.g., in the percentage of the time spent grooming and in their
patterns of grooming [56–59]. We only included studies of
coalition patterns among individuals of the same sex. We surveyed
26 studies, comprising 31 groups of 13 different species (Table 1).
The model
In our model, called GroofiWorld [36], we represent the essential
traits of primate societies:individuals group and they compete in the
group for unspecified reasons (Fig. S1). In this competition, the
effects of winning and losing are self-reinforcing [39,40,60,61] and
individuals try to avoid the risk of losing a fight [62]. When risks are
high, individuals will tend to avoid the risk of losing a fight by
grooming the other individual instead. Thus, individuals first
consider fighting and then grooming. This order is based on the
observation by Kummer that unfamiliar individuals will first fight
with each other and then groom [63]. Individuals in the model
become more anxious after a fight, as indicated in reality by the
increase in frequency of scratching and heart rateinboth opponents
[64–71]. In addition, in the model, their anxiety may subsequently
be reduced by the receipt of affiliative behaviour and, to a lesser
degree by active grooming, as indicated by the reduced heart rate
and the drop in the rate of self-directed behaviour in many species
[68,69,71–73]. Furthermore, our model is informed by empirical
studies on grooming and opiate administration which indicate that
not being groomed for some length of time reduces the concentra-
tion of endorphins and increases the motivation to be groomed, and
that grooming increases the level of endorphins in the brain and
reduces the motivation to groom [74–79]. Individuals are activated
in random order, but if an individual is close to a fight, i.e., within a
certain radius (see Table 2 for radius of social facilitation), then it
may be activated earlier, i.e., through social facilitation (Table 2).
We refer to Text S1 and our earlier paper for more details of the
model [36]. Below, we describe the way in which coalitions were
recorded in the model, how parameters were set, and analyses and
experiments were carried out.
Coalitions
If two individuals attack the same target in two subsequent
activations, this is classified as an event of coalition and opposition
(Fig. 1; video S1).
Parameters
Where possible, we kept the parameters of the model (Table 2)
the same as in our previous studies [36,80]. However, in order to
also study interaction patterns among males in the future (Puga-
Gonzalez et al, in prep), and given that the number of males in
primate groups is lower than that of females, we used a larger group
Figure 1. Coalitions in GrooFiWorld. At time 1, individuals A and B
are fighting. At time 2, individual C attacks B and hereby supports A and
opposes B (contra-support). Individual C is the supporter and individual
B is the target (see video S1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037271.g001
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e37271size to reach the minimal sample size of four that is required for the
statistical analysis of males. Empirical studies show that the
percentage of males in groups is approximately 30% in egalitarian
primates and approximately 20% in despotic primates [81–83].
Therefore, our group size of 30 individuals included 21 females and
9 malesatlowintensityand 24femalesand 6 malesathigh intensity.
As a consequence of increasing the group size to 30 individuals, one
empirical pattern was no longer met: the percentage of time spent
fighting among females was no longer lower at high intensity of
aggression when compared to low intensity of aggression [51,84].
We solved this problem by increasing the risk-aversion of an
individual, RiskAvers, when its opponent’s intensity of aggression was
higher (Equation 1). Consequently, the percentage of time spent
fighting was lower at high intensity of aggression than at low
intensity of aggression, in accordance with empirical data. Here, the
average number of ‘mental’ battles at high intensity of aggression
was ,2 and at low intensity, ,1.
RiskAvers~2IntensityAggressionOpponent ð1Þ
Experimental set-up
We performed four experiments to understand what caused the
patterns of coalition in the model. First, we switched off ‘social
facilitation’ (i.e., the shortening of the waiting-time of those
individuals close to a dominance interaction). Thus, when social
facilitation is off, individuals close to a fight are as likely to be
activated next as any other individual. Second, we disabled rank
differences among individuals by randomly shuffling Dom values
among all individuals after every activation. We used fixed Dom
values (thus switching off the self-reinforcing effects). We took these
Dom values for the corresponding intensity of aggression from the
middle of the interval in which the Dom values were considered to
have stabilized, thus, from between periods 200 and 260 (i.e.,
period 230) [85]. Third, we investigated the role of non-random
spatial structure by making individuals interact with randomly
chosen partners. Fourth, we investigated the role of the
combination of spatial structure and rank by disabling them
simultaneously. See Table S1 for further experimental manipula-
tions of the behavioural rules (taking out the effect of anxiety on
grooming, adjusting the probability of attacking other individuals
to 28% at high intensity and 42% at low intensity (percentages are
adjusted such that the same percentage of fights results as in the
full model), independent of the risks involved, and reversing the
order of behavioural rules concerning aggression and grooming
and randomizing the order).
Data collection and analysis
Every run consisted of 260 periods and each period consisted of
600 activations (i.e., GroupSize times 20). Data were collected
Table 2. Default parameter values in ‘GrooFiWorld’.
Parameter Description Females Males
General Parameters
GroupSize Total number of individuals 30
Sex ratio (at high aggression intensity) Number of 24 6
Sex ratio (at low aggression intensity) Number of 21 9
InitRadius Predefined space at start of simulation 1.7*# Inds 1.7*# Inds
Radius of social facilitation Radius starting from centre point between two opponents 10 10
Grouping Parameters
PersSpace Close encounter distance 8 8
NearView Medium distance 24 24
MaxView Maximal viewing distance 50 50
SearchAngle Turning angle to find others 90u 90u
VisionAngle Angle of field of view 90u 90u
Dominance Parameters
InitDom Initial Dom value 16 32
RiskAvers (high intensity) Number of ‘mental battles’ ,2 (Eq. 1) ,2 (Eq. 1)
RiskAvers (low intensity) Number of ‘mental battles’ ,1 (Eq. 1) ,1 (Eq. 1)
StepDom (high intensity) Scaling factor for aggression intensity 0.8 1
StepDom (low intensity) Scaling factor for aggression intensity 0.08 0.1
FleeingDistance After losing a fight 2 2
ChaseDistance After winning a fight 1 1
Grooming Parameters
InitAnx Initial anxiety value 0.5 0.5
AnxInc Increase in anxiety after every activation 1% 1%
AnxDcrGree Decrease of anxiety of groomee 0.15 0.15
AnxDcrGrmr Decrease of anxiety of groomer 0.1 0.1
AnxIncFight Increase of anxiety after fighting 0.1 0.1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037271.t002
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values. Data consisted of spatial position and direction of each
individual and, for coalitions, fights and grooming behaviour of: 1)
the actor and receiver and of the winner and loser and 2) the Dom
values and degree of anxiety. For each condition (the complete
model, and the models without one or more assumptions), 10
independent replicas were run for each of the two aggression
intensities (high and low). The results are shown as the average
value of the statistic over 10 runs for each condition. Their
combined probability is based on the improved Bonferroni
procedure [86]. We used non-parametric statistics and two-tailed
probabilities. We only used one-tailed probabilities if patterns were
predicted by empirical studies.
The percentage of time individuals spend fighting (or grooming)
was calculated by dividing the total number of fights (or grooming
bouts) by the total number of activations. Similar to empirical
studies, the percentage of coalitions was calculated as the total
number of coalitions divided by the total number of fights [44,50].
The rank of group members was calculated as the average Dom
value for each individual per run over periods 200–260. We used
an average measure because we correlated it with an average
measure of aggressive and affiliative acts, i.e., data were summed
over the whole interval of period 200–260.
The hierarchical differentiation among individuals was mea-
sured by the coefficient of variation of Dom values for the average
rank of each individual over period 200–260 and this was
averaged over 10 runs. Higher values indicate greater rank
distances between individuals [38]. Hierarchical differentiation is
also reflected in the empirical behavioural measure of the degree
of unidirectionality of aggression, which we present as well [51,87].
The degree to which dominant individuals of a certain sex
occupy the centre of the group was measured by a correlation
between an individual’s average Dom value and the average
spatial direction of others around it. The centrality of each
individual is calculated by means of circular statistics by drawing a
unit circle around ‘ego’ and projecting the direction of other group
members as points on the circumference of this circle [88]. The
connection of these points with ego’s location results in vectors.
The length of the average vector represents the degree to which
group members form a cluster relative to ego. Thus, longer mean
vectors indicate a more peripheral, and hence, less central location
of ego. The centrality of dominants is therefore represented by a
negative correlation between rank and the length of the average
vector (indicating the average direction of other individuals).
Correlations between the distribution of grooming, aggression,
support and opposition among individuals, and between social
interactions and rank and proximity were computed by means of
the Tau-Kr correlation, as described by Hemelrijk [87,89].
Matrices of support (and opposition) were corrected for opportu-
nity (number of fights) to support (or oppose) each partner.
Matrices of proximity were constructed using the average distance
between individuals. All matrices were based on data collected
over the supposedly stable periods from 200 to 260. The level of
significance was calculated using 2000 permutations [87,89]. We
tested for reciprocity and exchange of attack, grooming, support
and opposition by correlating an actor and receiver matrix with
the Tau-Kr correlation [89]. To compare our results to those for
real primates, we investigated the possibility that correlations were
a side-effect of a correlation with a third variable by partialling it
out using partial Tau-Kr correlations [87]. The third variables
concerned rank and proximity.
Whether social behaviour (i.e., grooming, aggression, support
and opposition) was directed up the hierarchy or towards partners
of similar rank was computed, respectively, using the Tau-Kr
correlation between the matrix of social behaviour and the matrix
of the rank of partners (with the average Dom values of partners in
the rows) and the matrix of partners of similar rank (filled with
zeros apart from the partners closest and second closest in rank,
which are indicated as 1’s). Note that higher-ranking individuals
have higher Dom values. Thus, a significant positive correlation
corresponds to social behaviour being directed up the hierarchy
and towards individuals of similar rank, respectively.
Because of the high number of correlations, significant results
may arise by chance. We corrected for this in two ways. We used
the Bonferroni correction and discarded the 5% of the lowest
significances (Type I error) per table of results.
Results
Empirical patterns
In our survey of the empirical literature on coalitions in
primates, we focus on females because they have been studied
more often than males (in 22 studies versus 14 studies on
males).These results serve as predictions for our models. Our
survey shows that, on average, adult females form coalitions in 5%
of their fights (based on 10 studies, Table 1), that these coalitions
are most often conservative (all-down), less often bridging and least
often revolutionary (all-up, 16–18 in Table 3), and that they reveal
patterns that have been attributed to triadic awareness in the
choice of coalition partners (19–21 in Table 3). This is inferred
when individuals solicit support from others that are higher in rank
than either they, themselves, or their opponent, even if the solicitor
ranks below the opponent [13,17], and when individuals
(independent of their rank relative to the opponent) solicit support
from others with a better relationship with them than with their
opponent [13,17]. Further, adult females reciprocate support at a
group level in 50% of the studies (5/10), or 100% when excluding
the studies based on partial correlations [44,46], they exchange
support for receipt of grooming in 100% (4/4) of the studies and
they groom for receipt of support in 57% (8/14) (or 78% when
excluding partial correlations: [44]) of the studies (Table 1).
Reciprocation of opposition was tested among adult females in a
single study only, namely in chimpanzee females, and appeared to
be absent [30]. Whether results differ between dominance style,
i.e., egalitarian and despotic, cannot be tested due to the small
sample size.
Analysis of empirical coalition patterns in the model
With reference to the percentage of fights with coalitions, the model
generates percentages of incidental support that resemble those in
real primates if vocal coalitions are included (13 in Table 3),
despite the absence of any rules for coalition-formation. Further-
more, the percentages are higher than those for empirical data
from which vocal coalitions have been excluded (Mann-Whitney
U: high intensity vs empirical data, n1=10, n2=9, U=80,
p,0.01; low intensity versus empirical data, n1=10, n2=9,
U=79, p,0.01). As is the case for empirical data, coalitions in the
model appear to be triadic more often than polyadic, but the
percentage of triadic coalitions (96%–98%, 14 in Table 3) is higher
than for empirical data, at 75%, and that of polyadic coalitions is
lower, at 2–4%, in the model than for empirical data, at 25% (15
in Table 3) [90].
At high intensity of aggression in the model, coalition types are
most often conservative, sometimes bridging, and least often
revolutionary (16–18 in Table 3), while at low intensity of
aggression, coalitions are usually revolutionary and less often
conservative or bridging (Mann-Whitney U test, n=10; revolu-
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e37271Table 3. Dominance, affiliation and coalition patterns among females: empirical data and GrooFiWorld.
Empirical studies on macaques GrooFiWorld
Intensity of Aggression Despotic Egalitarian High Low
Dominance Style
1) Gradient of the hierarchy (CV)
1 NA NA 0.72 0.36
Gradient of the hierarchy High . Low NA U=100***
2) Unidirectionality of Aggression (TauKr)
2True
2NS 20.13** 0.51***
Unidirectionality of aggression High . Low
2True U=100**
3) Time spent fighting (%)
2NA
2NA 13% 17%
Fighting % High,Low
2NA U=100***
4) Relative female dominance
30.23
30.00 0.22 0.00
Relative female dominance High . Low
3True U=100***
5) Average distance among all group members
2High
2Low 29 25
Average distance High,Low
2NA U=97***
6) Centrality of Dominants (Tau)
2True
2NA 20.40** 20.10
Centrality High . Low
2NA U=100***
Affiliative patterns
7) Time spent grooming (%)
28–15
2NA 17 20
8) Conciliatory Tendency
27–18
220–50 21 31
Conciliatory tendency High,Low
2U=66* U=100***
9) Grooming Reciprocation (TauKr)
2True
2True 0.39*** 0.54***
Grooming Reciprocation High,Low
2NA U=94***
10) Grooming up the hierarchy (TauKr)
2True
2NS 0.34*** 0.04
Grooming up the hierarchy High . Low
2True U=100***
11) Grooming partners of similar rank (TauKr)
2True
2NS 0.13** 20.01
Grooming partner of similar rank High . Low
2True U=100***
12) Reconciliation with valuable partners (TauKr)
2True
2True 0.37*** 0.11**
Reconciliation valuable partners High . Low
2NA U=78*
Coalition patterns
Intensity of Aggression Despotic and Egalitarian combined
4 High Low
13) % of fights involving coalitions
55%/9% 10% 7%
14) % of triadic coalitions (3 individuals)
675% 96% 98%
15) % of tetradic coalitions (4 individuals)
625% 4% 2%
Coalition types against adults
16) Conservative coalitions %
770% 71% 29%
17) Bridging coalitions %
726% 21% 27%
18) Revolutionary coalitions %
74% 8% 44%
Jonckheere-Terpstra test (C.B.R) JT=0*** JT=205 NS
Patterns related to triadic awareness
19) Recipient,Target,Supporter
88 84% +(67%)***
15 2(24%)***
15
20) Support given to ‘friend’
99 67% +(70%)***
15 +(54%)*
15
21) Support given to ‘friend’
10 10NA +(69%)***
15 +(53)%*
15
TauKr correlations
22) Reciprocation of support (TauKr)
11True 0.38*** 0.27***
23) Grooming for Support Received (TauKr)
12True 0.36*** 0.29***
24) Support for Grooming Received (TauKr)
13True 0.29*** 0.36***
25) Reciprocation of opposition (TauKr)
14NS NA 20.11** 0.29***
Coalition patterns: empirical results of egalitarian and despotic species are lumped except for the frequency of coalition types which are reported in a single study [121].
Results represent the average over 10 runs. P-value based on the Bonferroni correction:
*=p,0.05;
**=p,0.01,
***=p,0.001.
1Among all individuals.
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bridging: U=100, p,0.01; conservative vs bridging: U=63,
p.0.1).
In relation to triadic awareness of the choice of coalition partners
(19 in Table 3), despite the absence of soliciting behaviour in our
model, supporters appear mostly to be higher in rank than the
receiver (i.e., the individual that could have solicited) and also than
the target at high intensity of aggression, even if the receiver
(‘solicitor’) ranks below its opponent. This resembles pooled
empirical data for individuals of both sexes in studies on capuchin
monkeys and Japanese macaques [13,17]. Further, in agreement
with empirical data, the relationship of the supporter – measured
by the sociality index of Perry and co-authors [13]- is better with
the receiver (‘solicitor’) than with the target in the model at both
intensities (20, 21 in Table 3).
Females reciprocate support and interchange grooming for receipt of
support and support for receipt of grooming at both intensities of
aggression in the model (22–24 in Table 3). This resembles
empirical data, but reciprocation of support and exchange of
grooming for support are found at a higher frequency (100% vs
50% and 100% vs 57% respectively) in the model.
Supporting a certain individual in a triadic fight implies
opposing the other individual. Opposition is reciprocated at low
intensity of aggression (thus, individuals more often oppose those
partners from whom they receive more opposition [87]) but not
reciprocated at high intensity of aggression, resembling results for
female chimpanzees [30], and it is even unidirectional (25 in
Table 3). In addition to empirically-derived hypotheses, we also
studied other correlations of opposition with grooming and
support. At both intensities of aggression in the model, females
oppose those individuals more frequently whom they support
more often (11 in Table S2) and by whom they are groomed more
often (10 in Table S2) and females receive opposition more often
from those partners whom they groom and support more
frequently (9, 12 in table S2). It thus appears that ‘services’ are
exchanged for harmful acts.
There are several significant differences at a high versus low
intensity of aggression: 1. The percentage of coalitions that is
conservative is higher (high vs low intensity of aggression, Mann-
Whitney U=100, p,0.001) and the percentage that is revolu-
tionary is lower (high vs low intensity of aggression, Mann-
Whitney U=100, p,0.001), 2. Individuals more frequently show
‘triadic awareness of choice of coalition partners at high than at
low intensity, 3. The degree of reciprocity of support is greater (1
in Table S3), 4. The correlation for exchange of grooming for
support is stronger and the correlation for support for grooming is
weaker (20, 21 in Table 4; 2, 3 in Table S3), 5. Opposition is
unidirectional at high intensity and bidirectional at low intensity of
aggression (4 in table S3).
Causation of coalition patterns in the model and
predictions for empirical data
In empirical studies, patterns of reciprocation and exchange are
considered to be based on record-keeping, so-called ‘calculated
reciprocity’, if they remain statistically significant when proximity,
rank, kinship and age are partialled out [20,22,30], as in this case
they are not considered to be a side-effect of these factors [20,91].
Unexpectedly, all the correlations for reciprocation and exchange
in the model remain significant even when proximity and rank are
partialled out (age and kinship are absent in the model, Tables S3).
Thus, correlations in the model resemble empirical data.
However, in the model, no records are kept by the individuals
on acts given and received, nor on support or on grooming.
Because partial correlations may not sufficiently exclude the
dynamics of rank and proximity [92], we did experiments in the
model in which we removed the effects of rank and of proximity
more rigorously than is achieved by partial correlation. We
removed the effects of three different assumptions in turn, i.e., that
interactions are influenced by social facilitation and by proximity
(by making individuals choose interaction partners at random) and
that there are differences among individuals in dominance rank
(by shuffling ranks between adults). We investigated the conse-
quences for the following eight patterns: percentage of coalitions,
relative frequency of three coalition types, two patterns related to
triadic awareness, and the occurrence of significance in four
correlations (combined over 10 replica-runs), i.e., of reciprocation
of support and opposition, grooming for receipt of support, and
support for the receipt of grooming. The greatest reduction (i.e.,
94%) in the number of significant patterns occurred when
simultaneously disabling the effects of both proximity and rank,
a slightly lower reduction occurred when merely disabling the
effects of proximity, i.e., 50% at both intensities, a still lower
reduction when omitting social facilitation (i.e., 50% at high
intensity and 25% at low intensity) and when shuffling ranks, i.e.,
38% at high intensity and 12% at low intensity (13–22 in Table 5).
This led to the following explanations for the coalition patterns:
The percentage of fights that involved coalitions are a consequence
of social facilitation and proximity, as can be seen from their
decrease without these assumptions (13 in Table 5). Social
facilitation strengthens the effects of proximity by increasing the
likelihood of forming coalitions, because individuals that are close
to a fight are activated next.
The type of support is a side-effect of risk aversion and individual
differences in dominance rank, as can be seen when ranks are
shuffled. In this case, the three types of support become similar in
their frequency (14–16 in Table 5).
With reference to triadic awareness in the choice of coalition
partners, the supporter is higher in rank than both the target and
the receiver, as is the case for empirical data. However, in the
2See our previously analyzed empirical data in: [36];
3[42].
4These species include more than macaques, also baboons and chimpanzees.
5Excluding vocal coalitions/including vocal coalitions.
6[90].
7[121].
8[17]: This study concerns males and females combined;
9[13];
10Omitting support from the relationship quality index [13];
1113,26,28,29 in Table 1;
122,6,8,9,13,14,18,19,20,29 in Table 1;
134,11,12,13,29 in Table 1.
14[30].
15Supporter higher ranking than target and recipient: + more frequent than chance; 2 less frequent than chance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037271.t003
Table 3. Cont.
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low intensity (19 in Table 3). This pattern arises as a side-effect of
rank and proximity, because it disappears if the effects of rank and
space are removed (17B, 17C in Table 5). Clearly, individuals that
are closer will have more opportunities to support each other and,
at a high intensity, individuals that are of higher rank than an
opponent and receiver will experience less risk in providing
support. Since there are no data on triadic awareness among
female primates in egalitarian species, we predict that in empirical
studies on egalitarian species, females will also solicit others that
are higher in rank less often than both the solicitor and target, than
is the case in despotic species (18 in Table 4).
Reciprocation of support among females is due to social facilitation
and proximity. This is clear, because it is weakened when social
facilitation is disabled and it disappears after taking out proximity
and making individuals randomly choose interaction partners
(19AC in Table 5). Reciprocation of support emerges because
certain individuals are more often in close proximity than other
individuals and, thus have more opportunities for attacking the
same opponents. In fact, two individuals may attack the same
target in turn for several consecutive activations when the victim,
by fleeing from one opponent, ends up in the space occupied by
the other opponent, a kind of spatial entrapment (see video S1)
[93]. Such immediate reciprocation happens at high intensity in
25% of the cases of support and at low intensity in 7% of cases.
When we exclude immediate reciprocation, the patterns in Table 3
remain, but the percentage of fights involving coalitions decreases
at high intensity of aggression (from 10 to 7%, 1 in Table S4), and
reciprocation of support is weakened at both intensities, but still
significant in all runs (5 in Table S4). Further, the interchange of
grooming for receipt of support and of support for receipt of
grooming remains similar in significance without immediate
reciprocation (6,7 in Table S4). This interchange emerges as a
side-effect of proximity and rank: these correlations are signifi-
cantly weakened when the effects of social facilitation and
proximity are excluded and become non-significant if females
choose their interaction partners at random and their ranks are
simultaneously shuffled (20, 21 in Table 5).
Opposition in the model is bidirectional at low intensity of
aggression (thus, individuals more often oppose those partners
from whom they receive more opposition [87]) and unidirectional
at high intensity of aggression (25 in Table 3). This also applies if
we exclude immediate reciprocation (8 in Table S4). This is
expected, as no separate rule for support (or opposition) has been
added (both are in the eye of the observer), opposition is a specific
instance of dyadic aggression, and dyadic aggression is more
Table 4. Model-based hypotheses.
Model-based hypotheses for adult females: Empirical data
A) In general:
1) Revolutionary coalitions are more frequent the higher the percentage of males in the group NA
2) In larger groups the conciliatory tendency is higher and the correlation for the valuable relationship hypothesis is stronger. NA
3) The stronger the degree of social facilitation, the higher the frequency of support and the percentage of polyadic support NA
4) The number of coalitions among females is higher the higher their percentage in the group NA
Females:
5) Groom those more often that they support more frequently Pro: [30]
6) Receive grooming more frequently from those that they more often receive support from NA
7) Receive aggression more often from those that they more frequently receive opposition from NA
8) Aggress those more often that they oppose more frequently NA
9) Groom those more often that they more frequently receive opposition from Contra: [30]
10) Oppose those more often that they more frequently receive grooming from NA
11) Oppose those more often that they more frequently support NA
12) Support those more often that they more frequently receive opposition from NA
B) In egalitarian species:
13) Opposition is bidirectional Contra: [20]
C) In despotic species:
14) Females receive support more frequently from partners, the higher the rank of their partner Pro: [30]
15) Opposition is unidirectional Pro: [20]
16) Supporters are significantly more often higher ranking than the target of the coalition, even if
the recipient of support ranks below the target
Pro: [17,23]
D) In despotic compared to egalitarian species
1
17) Coalitions are less often revolutionary NA
1
18) Females will more often solicit others that are higher in rank than both the solicitor and target. NA
the correlation at a group level for:
19) reciprocation of support is stronger NA
20) the exchange of grooming for support is stronger NA
21) the exchange of support for grooming is weaker NA
1This is in line with the model-based predictions by van Schaik and co-authors [128].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037271.t004
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Table 3) [36–38]. Furthermore, as expected, opposition is
significantly correlated with the remaining cases of dyadic
aggression (6, 7 in Table S2). Patterns of bidirectionality at low
intensity of aggression and unidirectionality at high intensity
disappear after taking out both spatial structure and the effects of
ranks by shuffling ranks (22D in Table 5).
Correlations for reciprocation of opposition and for opposition
with grooming and support remain when immediate reciprocation
is excluded, Table S4. They are a side-effect of correlations for
dyadic aggression with grooming and support (8–12 in Table S2).
The patterns of bi- and unidirectionality of opposition, correlations
for opposition with aggression and for ‘exchange’ between
opposition and support or grooming may be used directly as
model-based predictions to be tested empirically (7–12, 13, 15 in
Table 4).
Differences between high and low intensity
Regarding patterns indicating triadic awareness in the choice of
coalition partner, supporters are more often higher ranked than
the target and the receivers at high intensity compared to low
intensity, because due to the steep hierarchy, supporters of lower
rank experience more risk of being defeated, whereas such risks for
individuals of different ranks are more similar at low intensity due
to the weak hierarchy.
With reference to the type of coalitions among females, the
percentage of conservative coalitions is higher at high aggression
intensity, as a consequence of the hierarchy being steeper than at
low intensity (1 in Table 3). The steeper hierarchy increases the
aversion of attacking higher ranking individuals and the likelihood
of attacking lower ranking individuals, thus leading to conservative
coalitions most often, and to bridging coalitions at an intermediate
frequency (16–18 Table 3). In contrast, revolutionary coalitions
between females are more frequent at low intensity of aggression.
This is due to the weaker hierarchy and the stronger subordinance
of females to males at a low aggression intensity than at a high
aggression intensity (4 in Table 3), which resembles the greater
subordinance of female egalitarian macaques to males compared
to despotic macaques [42]. Indeed, when we exclude coalitions of
females against males at a low intensity, revolutionary coalitions
become less frequent than bridging and conservative coalitions, as
is the case for high intensity, C.B.R (Jonckheere-Terpstra test,
n=10, JT=28.5, p,0.001). At low intensity, the number of
opportunities for females to attack higher ranking individuals is
greater than at high intensity for two reasons: 1) the subordinance
of females relative to males is greater than at high intensity (4 in
Table 3) and 2) the percentage of males in the group is higher
(30% vs. 20% at high intensity). With reference to the percentage
of males, if the percentage of males in the group is increased from
approximately 25% (20% at high intensity or 30% at low
intensity), via 50% to 70% in the model, the number of
revolutionary coalitions among females increases from 8 to 10 to
20% at high intensity and from 44 to 55 to 73% at low intensity.
Thus, we predict that the higher the percentage of males in the
group, the higher the frequency of revolutionary coalitions
compared to conservative or bridging coalitions (1 in Table 4).
Because empirical data on coalition types in egalitarian species are
lacking, this result serves as a prediction: coalitions among females
in egalitarian species should more often be revolutionary than in
despotic species (17 in table 4).
At a high intensity, females reciprocate support more often than at a
low intensity, because reciprocation more often happens immedi-
ately. This is because individuals in the group are spaced further
apart (5 in Table 3) and series of immediate reciprocation thus
continue for longer because there is less ‘interference’ from other
individuals close by. The greater spacing of individuals in the
group is a consequence of the repeated fleeing of lower ranking
individuals, due to the steeper hierarchy [38]. Because the spacing
of individuals in groups of despotic macaques is also greater than
that in egalitarian macaques, we predict that empirical data for
despotic societies compared to egalitarian societies will reveal
relatively less frequent revolutionary support and conservative
support to be more frequent, and support to be reciprocated more
often (17,19 in Table 4). Furthermore, there is a stronger
correlation for exchange of grooming for support and a weaker
correlation for support for grooming at a high intensity than at a
low intensity (20, 21 in Table 4; 2, 3 in Table S3). This is a
consequence of the fact that at high intensity, both variables,
grooming and receipt of support, are significantly positively
correlated with the rank of the partner (10 in Table 3; 3 in Table
S2), while this is not the case for the variables of support and
receipt of grooming (4, 5 in Table S2). This results in the model-
based prediction for high intensity, that individuals receive support
more frequently from partners, the higher the rank of the partners,
for which there is also some empirical evidence (14 in Table 4).
Other patterns, such as the association between grooming other
individuals and supporting them (1,2 in table S2), can also be used
as hypotheses for empirical data (5,6 in Table 4).
Sensitivity-analysis of coalition patterns
The patterns of reciprocation and exchange appear to be robust
against changes to the parameters, as they depend only weakly on
the percentage of coalitions, the number of individuals and the
degree of aversion of risks. They remain significant as long as the
percentage of coalitions is above ,4% for females (see caption in
Table S5) and the number of females is at least 8 at high and 12 at
low intensity of aggression (Table S5). If the risk aversion is
increased from winning twice mentally before attacking to winning
mentally 3, 4 or 5 times, the patterns of types of support, exchange
and reciprocation of support and opposition remain qualitatively
the same (Table S5).
The patterns of reciprocation of support and its exchange for
grooming also appear to be robust against changes in the
behavioural rules. They appear to remain significant under the
following experimental manipulations (Text S1 and Table S1): 1)
when we change the order of the rules for aggression and
grooming (by reversing the order, by first considering grooming
and then fighting and by taking a random order in which to
consider both acts, column AB in Table S1), 2) when we omit the
induction of grooming by anxiety and instead make individuals
always groom when they expect to lose a fight (C in table S1), and
3) when omitting the aversion of the risk of losing a fight, but
giving individuals a specific chance of attacking at high intensity
and at low intensity (see experimental setup), independent of the
risks involved (column D in table S1). The proportions of different
types of coalitions only changed compared to the full model when
risk-aversion at high intensity was omitted (Table S1). Note that
the manipulation of omitting risk aversion is similar to shuffling
ranks. With reference to reciprocation (bidirectionality) of
opposition, unidirectional opposition at high intensity depends
on risk aversion and on the order of the behavioural rules in the
same way as dyadic aggression (22 in columns A and D in Table
S1). Patterns that may be considered indications of triadic
awareness in the choice of coalition partners depend on risk
aversion and on the order of the behavioural rules at high
aggression intensity (17, 18 in Table S1).
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We have shown that our model does a good job at predicting
the relative percentage of different types of coalitions, patterns
indicative of triadic awareness in the choice of coalition partners
and patterns of reciprocation and exchange. The model succeeds
at this by reducing the problem to the right variables. It reveals
how patterns of support and opposition, their reciprocation and
exchange may emerge as a side-effect of socio-spatial structure
through self-organization. The processes of socio-spatial structur-
ing are mostly a consequence of dominance interactions [37,38].
Rank-related patterns (such as more frequent grooming of other
individuals higher in rank at high intensity of aggression) are due
to rank and aversion of the risks of being defeated [36]. Patterns of
support are due to socio-spatial structure, with social facilitation
playing a lesser role. These patterns arise because the socio-spatial
structure implies that certain individuals are often close to specific
other individuals. This automatically causes the occurrence of
support (and opposition) in fights, reciprocation and exchange for
grooming. The experiments in the model and the sensitivity
analysis of its parameters and behavioural rules show that the
occurrence of support, its reciprocation and exchange are robust.
This is surprising, because the model drops ‘rational’ or
‘deliberate’ choices by individuals to support others in fights, it
lacks triadic awareness and lacks record-keeping. Similar processes
of socio-spatial structuring through dominance interactions and
differences in fighting power (rank) and avoidance of risks, may
also automatically induce patterns of support and opposition, their
reciprocation and exchange in real primates. Indeed spatial
centrality of dominants is also found in real primates [94–102] and
seems stronger in despotic species than in egalitarian species [38].
It is worth comparing existing explanations of a number of
empirical findings to those of the present model.
First, the finding that chimpanzees reciprocated both support
and opposition and that macaques reciprocated only support but
not opposition has been taken as evidence that the chimpanzees
simultaneously consider more aspects of social relationships than
macaques and that chimpanzees are revengeful, but macaques are
not [20,34]. However, no reciprocation of opposition was found
for chimpanzees in the same data set when data were analyzed on
an annual basis (instead of being lumped over five consecutive
summers), neither was opposition reciprocated when studied by
sex [30]. Absence of reciprocation of opposition is in line with the
model because reciprocation of opposition is absent at high
intensity and we assume that chimpanzees in this colony are
despotic rather than egalitarian, because the dominance style of
chimpanzees is most despotic in communities (such as Taı ¨) where
grouping is densest [103]. In this captive colony, grouping is dense
and frequency of aggression is high as well, which results in a more
despotic dominance style than when the individuals in groups are
more spaced apart and aggression is rarer, as is the case in natural
conditions [104]. Despotism in this captive colony is also apparent
because the higher the rank of the partner, the more often the
females in this colony groom others [30], which is a pattern that is
typical of macaques that are despotic, but not of those that are
egalitarian [105].Thus, lack of reciprocation of opposition in the
Arnhem colony is in line with the model, which suggests that
reciprocation of opposition is constrained by avoidance of the risks
of attacking higher ranking individuals because the hierarchy is
steep. In contrast, if the hierarchy is weak, opposition automat-
ically becomes more reciprocal (also referred to as bi-directional),
because the mutual risks are more similar. Thus, the model offers
up the difference in the hierarchical gradient as an alternative
explanation to the usually assumed difference in intelligence.
Second, Silk [45] finds reciprocation of support and opposition
in male bonnet macaques (Macaca radiata). This is also in line with
the model as bonnet macaques are egalitarian [51]. Silk reasons
that if individuals classify other individuals into allies and
adversaries, they should more often give support to those whom
they oppose less. Contrary to this, her data show instead that
individuals more frequently support those individuals that they
oppose more often. This association reflects what our model
predicts.
Third, stronger patterns of coalition formation have been found
in despotic than egalitarian species among female macaques and
this has been attributed to the stronger effects of kin and nepotism
[106]. Although this may be true, our model indicates possible
alternative causes. It suggests that stronger reciprocation of
support among despotic females than among egalitarian females
is due to the higher degree of immediate reciprocation, which is
caused by the greater spacing between females in the despotic
group. The lower spatial density in the model lengthens the chains
of mutual support in fights that are undisturbed [92].
Fourth, empirical data reveal that individuals solicit support by
headflagging more often to other individuals ranked above them
and to those with better relationships with themselves than with
the opponent [13,15,17,23]. In the model, although headflagging
is absent, individuals still receive more support from higher
ranking individuals, but this is not due to triadic awareness in the
model. Instead, it arises as a side-effect of rank and proximity (17
in Table 5). Individuals may also be more easily solicited in reality
when they are closer to the solicitor and the fight. Those
individuals that are closer to the solicitor are the individuals that
experience less risk, thus, they will be the individuals that are
higher ranked than the other two (i.e., the potential receiver and
the target).
Fifth, in several species, individuals more often support those
individuals in fights that they also groom more frequently
[30,107]. This has been explained by cognitive mechanisms, but
classical conditioning has also been suggested [30,108]. The
present model provides an even simpler explanation, the
association is a side-effect of spatial proximity.
Sixth, when patterns of reciprocation and exchange remain
significant, after partialling out proximity, kinship, rank and age, it
is concluded that reciprocation and exchange are ‘calculated’ by
record-keeping [20,22,30]. However, these are not calculated in
the model and patterns of reciprocation and exchange still remain
after partialling out rank and proximity. Apparently, these
statistical procedures do not deal satisfactorily with complex
nonlinear effects due to the socio-spatial structuring [11,37,92],
because when we remove the effects of proximity (or both rank
and proximity) by an experimental procedure in the model,
reciprocation and exchange are no longer significant (19–22CD in
Table 5). Thus, the model shows that it does not suffice to partial
out proximity in order to eliminate its effects. It appears that the
partial correlation has not completely excluded the dynamics of
these effects because a partial correlation represents a linear,
additive approach and effects of fights on spatial structure are
nonlinear [109]. This serves as an important warning for the
interpretation of these correlations.
Two important features of our work, its parsimony and
falsifiability, are reached by integrating many aspects, such as
spatial position, fights and grooming. As a consequence, the model
produces explanations that are cognitively parsimonious and
hypotheses that are easily tested because they concern aspects on
which much empirical data are available, such as dominance style
[38,42,110], affiliative behaviour [36] and coalitions in egalitarian
and despotic societies (Table 4).
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decade, we have gained more and more confidence in it [111];
first, we have shown that the patterns of the model at low and high
intensity of aggression resemble, respectively, egalitarian and
despotic societies regarding dominance style (namely, frequency of
aggression, average distance between individuals, symmetry of
aggression, spatial centrality of dominants, and decrease of
aggression when becoming ‘familiarized’) [37,38,85]; second, we
have predicted and confirmed greater female dominance relative
to males when dominance style is steeper and when the percentage
of males in the group is higher [42]; third, we have shown that
adding a rule of intending to groom to avoid the risks of losing a
fight and when being anxious led to patterns of grooming and
reconciliation resembling empirical data for both dominance styles
in macaques [36]; fourth, in the present paper, we show that the
model also reveals patterns of support (and opposition), recipro-
cation and interchange for grooming that resemble those in real
primates.
A point of critique by de Vries on an earlier study of our model
[112] has been that the directional inconsistency of the dominance
interactions is too low compared to that found in empirical data.
Due to the increased risk aversion in the current model (but for the
same number of fights), directional inconsistency has become
higher (0.91 among adults at a high intensity), while qualitatively
maintaining all reported results (Table S5) [38]. This value
resembles that found in empirical data on despotic macaques, M.
fuscata and M. fascicularis (Table 2 of de Vries). Whether the
directional inconsistency characterizes dominance style in a useful
way is, however, doubtful, because de Vries shows it to be higher
in egalitarian macaques than in despotic macaques [112], whereas
we would expect the opposite to hold.
In the present study, the frequency of polyadic fights is lower
than in reality. Note that the model presented here was
constructed before looking at data on coalitions. Instead, it was
loosely tuned to grouping and aspects of dominance style and
percentage of grooming [36]. The frequency of polyadic coalitions
may be heightened by increasing the biological realism of the
model, e.g., by including sexual behaviour. When we add sexual
attraction of males to females and make females come into oestrus
asynchronously, males have been shown to cluster close to a
female in oestrus [80]. Therefore, we may expect a higher number
of polyadic coalitions among these males [113].
The model is an extreme simplification of reality. Its social
complexity and biological realism could be increased, e.g., by
including recruitment behaviour, social bonding, feeding behav-
iour, kin-relations, different sex-age classes, immigration or
emigration or sexual behaviour. It should be stressed that our
model is not meant to show that primates are unintelligent. That
primates are intelligent is proven, for instance by the fact that they
show intentional imitation [114] and intentional exchanges in
experimental settings [26]. For some species, the model may
represent coalitions as they are at present, but for others they may
represent coalitionary behaviour as it was early in evolution,
because coalitions of these species have recently become cogni-
tively more sophisticated. In future, we will also use models to
study more sophisticated cognitive strategies of supporting others
in fights. However, it should be noted that even if primates are
using more intelligent strategies for coalitions, there will still be an
effect of socio-spatial structure on coalition patterns.
With regard to evolutionary explanations, our model indicates
that selection operates on complexes of interconnected traits rather
than single traits alone. For instance, according to our model, the
evolution of a higher intensity of aggression versus a milder
intensity is associated with automatic consequences for many
traits, e.g., a steeper hierarchy, greater female dominance over
males, less reconciliation, fewer revolutionary coalitions, stronger
reciprocation and exchange of support. Therefore, theories will
need to explain the evolution of the whole complex of integrated
traits. To relate the evolution of this complex to ecological
conditions, models must examine its evolution for several
distributions of food in a similar way as has been done in models
related to culture [115,116].
Our results have three clear implications. First, in contrast to the
common belief in empirical studies [20,22,30], correlations for
reciprocity and exchange in the model remain significant after
partialling out proximity and rank, even though these correlations
are not due to intentional or internally-guided rules for recipro-
cation or exchange. A different method other than partial
correlation is apparently required to exclude the effects of
proximity and of rank in the causation of patterns of reciprocation
and exchange. Secondly, for scientists interested in the actual
cognitive deliberation underlying spontaneous social behaviour in
groups of primates, it is essential to study the spatial positioning of
individuals in relation to their social behaviour. This is necessary
in order to see to what extent the social behaviour can be
attributed to socio-spatial structuring and what patterns are left
that must be attributed to active deliberation. Thirdly, this model
presents a starting point for developing a theory of social
behaviour that arises among individuals if only simple cognition
is present. Such theories are badly needed [104,117].
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Figure S1 Rules of behavioural interaction. White boxes:
grouping rules, black boxes: rules for dominance interactions, and
light grey boxes: rules of affiliation.
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Table S1 Sensitivity analysis of the behavioural rules.
Patterns among females. Results represent the average over 10
runs; P-value based on the Bonferroni correction: *p=,0.05;
**p=,0.01, ***p=,0.001. In bold: results that differ from the
full model.
1Supporter higher ranking than target and recipient: +
more frequent than chance; 2 less frequent than chance.
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Table S2 TauKr correlations concerning grooming,
support, opposition and rank among females in GrooFi-
World. Results represent the average TauKr value of 10 runs;
Significance is based on the Bonferroni correction: *=p,0.05;
**=p,0.01, ***=p,0.001.
11 correlation (5% of 24 correlations)
is considered to be a type I error.
(DOC)
Table S3 Tau Kr correlations for reciprocation and
exchange of support among females in GrooFiWorld
when partialling out rank and proximity. Values represent
the average over 10 runs; In bold: results that differ significantly
from the non-partial correlation. P-value based on the Bonferroni
correction: *p=,0.05; **p=,0.01, ***p=,0.001.
{ MW U
test=Mann-Whitney U test between high and low intensity of
aggression, H=higher at high intensity of aggression; L=higher
at low intensity of aggression; NS=not significant; n1=10,
n2=10.
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Table S4 Coalition patterns after controlling for imme-
diate reciprocity. Patterns among females. Results represent
the average over 10 runs; P-value based on the Bonferroni
correction: *p=,0.05; **p=,0.01, ***p=,0.001.
(DOC)
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complete model. Patterns among females in GrooFiWorld for
several group sizes, sex ratios and degrees of risk aversion. Results
represent the average over 10 runs; P-value based on the
Bonferroni correction: *p=,0.05; **p=,0.01, ***p=,0.001.
In bold: results that differ from the full model (in Table 3).
1At
low intensity of aggression a risk aversion base of 5 implies an
actual number of decisions to avoid risks of ,1 (see table 2).
2Among all individuals.
3One correlation (5% of 24 correlations) is
considered to be a type I error.
4For a social facilitation of 10%,
the percentage of fights involving coalitions is ,4% and all
coalition patterns among females are retained (results not shown,
data available on request).
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Text S1 Description of the details of the model and of
extra results that have been mentioned and discussed in
the main text.
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Video S1 Example of coalitions in GrooFiWorld. In this
video we show three individuals fighting (triadic interaction). The
individuals are represented by circles and their directions of
movement by blue arrows. The winner of the fight turns red and
the loser blue. Several instances of immediate reciprocation of
support can be observed. The two individuals on the top-right and
bottom-left of the screen alternate in attacking the individual in the
middle. Thus, the cooperators immediately reciprocate each
other’s support.
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